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Verify OAuth-grant forwarding

The consumer E2E lane checks that a locally issued, unbound person access token reaches an independent receiver with a valid v2 OAuth-grant envelope. It also checks the existing Arc client-credentials sample. It does not require a deployed Identity server or external credentials.

From the AuthProxy repository root, with Docker Compose, OpenSSL, and the .NET 10 and 11 SDKs installed:

Terminal window
bash E2E/run.sh

The script builds AuthProxy from the working tree, starts the test services, runs both clients, and stops the compose stack on success or failure. A nonzero exit means at least one check failed. The receiver’s Docker-free conformance check is also available separately:

Terminal window
dotnet run --project E2E/OAuthGrantReceiver/OAuthGrantReceiver.csproj -c Release -- --self-test

The receiver uses the independent Arc v2 reference verifier and all 220 published vectors pinned to Arc revision de9e176d5f669e2036ff3ab5bf85f60dad6a7d9b. Its local access-token validator verifies the issuer’s ES256 signature, issuer, audience, validity and person binding without using AuthProxy helpers. The receiver stores replay nonces atomically in one process; this is not a multi-replica receiver example.

The local issuer serves metadata, JWKS and introspection over HTTPS. Each run generates a throwaway CA and an issuer certificate with a DNS SAN for issuer. The CA is trusted only through a read-only runtime mount and SSL_CERT_FILE; hostname and certificate validation remain enabled. The CA never enters an image or the host trust store. Only the issuer gets its TLS private key. Only AuthProxy receives the envelope’s P-256 private signing material; the receiver gets the public key alone. The issuer’s access-token signing key is generated in memory at startup.

Gateway-to-receiver HTTP is an explicit LocalDevelopment exception, not a production transport example. The receiver supplies the reference verifier’s authenticated-transport input under that local exception. Production receivers still need authenticated TLS and shared, atomic replay storage. Keep every service in this lane isolated from real users and credentials: the issuer’s mint/revoke/outage controls and the receiver’s hostile-request shim intentionally have no authentication.

The receiver verifies principal, tenant, credential UUID, issuer, subject, authentication time, ACR, AMR, cache epoch, sender-binding state and the hash of the independently validated forwarded bearer. The unbound person path emits neither a grant-id nor an actor header; tokens with unverified actor claims are refused instead of promoting those claims into trusted evidence. REST and MCP-shaped JSON-RPC tools/list and tools/call paths must reach the receiver successfully. The MCP surface is a test subset, not a full lifecycle/session implementation. Successful REST and tool-call responses expose only the verified credential/person identifiers and a hash-match flag. This is a test verifier, not product code or an Arc installer; the manual real-Identity follow-up is described in the E2E README.

The client checks revoked tokens, an introspection outage, sender-constrained tokens, client-credentials tokens, unwrapped PATs, wrong audiences and issuers, and cookie-plus-bearer ambiguity. It uses a receiver ingress counter to ensure gateway rejections never reach the backend. The two-second positive introspection cache bounds revocation; the check allows one additional second for scheduling and network latency.

A receiver-local shim retains a successfully admitted request only in memory and checks tampered, forged, stripped and replayed envelopes, a swapped bearer, duplicate envelopes and unknown context headers. Tokens and signed request material are never returned by that shim. Caller-supplied identity and context headers are poisoned before a normal proxy request to verify stripping and reconstruction.

Runtime certificates and private material live in a per-run directory under .ai-work/e2e/ and are removed after the containers stop. If container cleanup fails, the script retains that directory and prints its path: stop the remaining containers before removing those files. Failure artifacts include only compose.log, never the runtime directory. Do not print environment files, request headers, bearer tokens or private material when diagnosing failures.

For production configuration, use Bearer authentication and Forwarded identity signing.